In this paper, we assess the impact of the securities transaction tax (STT) introduced in France in 2012 on market liquidity and volatility. To identify causality, we rely on the unique design of this tax that is imposed only on large French firms, all listed on Euronext. This provides two reliable control groups (smaller French firms and foreign firms also listed on Euronext) and allows using difference-in-difference methodology to isolate the impact of the tax from other economic changes occurring simultaneously. We find that the STT has reduced trading volume, but we find no effect on theoretically based measures of liquidity, such as price impact, and no significant effect on volatility. The results are robust if we rely on different control groups (German stocks), analyze dynamic effects or construct a control group by propensity score matching.
spreads and price impact measures, and have at most a weak effect on the informational efficiency of prices." They explained this result by arguing that the FTT has driven away both rational and noise traders. Song and Zhang (2005) come to a similar conclusion in a general equilibrium setting.
Hau (1998) also develops a model in which endogenous entry of traders may increase the capacity of the market to absorb exogenous supply risk, but at the same time it adds noise and endogenous trading risk. The competitive entry equilibrium is characterized by excessive market entry and excessively volatile prices. A positive tax on entrants can decrease trader participation and volatility while increasing market efficiency. Finally, there might be a Ushaped relationship between liquidity and excessive volatility (Haberer, 2004; Ehrenstein et al., 2005) . At low levels of market volume, greater liquidity reduces excess volatility.
However, after a certain point, the confusion caused by speculation creates a positive relationship between liquidity and excess volatility.
Since theoretical predictions are ambiguous, it is important to examine the impact of the FTT empirically. In this paper, we study the introduction, in 2012, of a 0.2 percent tax on daily acquisitions of French equity securities. We are interested in calculating the impact of this STT on market quality measured by market liquidity and volatility. Our contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, we believe that our study provides a rigorous investigation of causality between STT and market quality. This is possible due to the unique design of the French STT. As the tax is levied only on large French firms -all of them listed on Euronextthis provides two control groups: smaller French firms and foreign firms also listed on Euronext. Hence, we can rely on difference-in-difference methodology to isolate the impact of the tax from other economic or regulatory developments during the analyzed period.
Although some earlier studies follow this approach, their control groups are not fully convincing because stocks are traded in a completely different institutional environment, such as foreign or over-the-counter market (Umlauf, 1993; Pomeranets and Weaver, 2012) . It is important to note that the French STT is virtually the only tax in the world that has affected differently large and small firms. 10 Our second contribution consists in a rigorous analysis of different dimensions of market liquidity and volatility. Usual measures of liquidity in the academic literature can be classified in three main categories: volume-based measures (volume and turnover ratio), transaction cost 5 measures (bid-ask spread), and price-impact measures (liquidity ratio and price reversal).
These measures gauge different aspects of market liquidity and are often complements and not substitutes (Vayanos and Wang, 2012) . Similarly, we plan to investigate the impact on market volatility measured by several alternative measures, such as absolute and squared close-to-close returns, daily conditional variance, and price range.
Our study shows that the introduction of the French STT has reduced market volume, but there is no effect on theoretically based measure of liquidity, such as price impact. As to volatility measures, the results are statistically insignificant. The results are robust if we rely on different control groups (German stocks included in DAX and MDAX), analyze dynamic effects or construct a control group by propensity score matching. Overall, our results give support to the laboratory observations made by Bloomfield, O'Hara and Saar (2009) . For policy purposes, we can conclude that the French STT cannot be used as a Pigouvian tax to decrease market volatility, but it does not lead to harmful distortions either.
Recently, several unpublished studies have independently examined the impact of the French STT (Becchetti, Ferrari and Trenta, 2013; Colliard and Hoffman, 2013; Haferkorn and Zimmermann, 2013; Meyer, Wagener, and Weinhardt, 2013) . All these studies rely on a difference-in-difference methodology, but they only examined short-term effects (over a maximum period of a few months after the introduction of the tax). They are mainly interested in the impact on liquidity, and do not provide much evidence on volatility. Overall, they support our results.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the empirical literature. Section 3 describes the data, the empirical strategy and the construction of the liquidity and volatility measures. Section 4 reports our empirical results. Section 5 provides several robustness tests: different samples (smaller but more homogeneous), and different method (propensity score matching). Section 6 concludes.
Overview of the empirical literature
Since theoretical predictions are ambiguous, a number of papers empirically examine the impact of the STT on financial market 11 (see Table 1 for a summary). 12 When measuring the impact on liquidity (often proxied by volume), studies arrive at similar results as four out of 11 Empirical evidence form the housing market in Singapore is recently provided by Fu, Qian and Yeung (2013) . 12 A parallel body of literature examines the impact of the tick size on stock market quality. See Hau (2006) for a panel data study on the French market.
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6 five studies in Table 1 find negative impact on liquidity and one study finds statistically insignificant result. As to volatility, results are inconclusive. Six out of eleven studies find inconclusive or statistically insignificant results; four studies find an increase in volatility for some subsamples, and one study finds a decrease in volatility. However, most of these studies suffer from methodological shortcomings because they do not address endogeneity problems.
One potential source of endogeneity relates to reverse causality. Since transaction taxes are often perceived as a tool to reduce market volatility, it is likely that they are introduced in countries and during periods exhibiting high market volatility. Another source of endogeneity is due to simultaneity and omitted variable biases. In other words, we do not know how the same market would have behaved if the tax had not been introduced, as these studies do not allow us to isolate the impact of the STT from other economic developments or regulatory changes during the same time period. The three studies that suggest an increase of the stock market volatility (Baltagi, Li and Li, 2006; Phylaktis and Aristidou, 2007; Liau, 2012) do not control for simultaneity and omitted variable biases and, therefore, should be considered with caution.
Several studies attempt to overcome the above endogeneity problems by relying on difference-in-difference methodologies. In order to isolate the effect of the tax from other effects that could influence volatility, these studies compare the differential impact of STT changes on treatment and control groups. Different types of control groups have been considered: American Depository Receipts, foreign stocks, over-the-counter and forward markets. Umlauf (1993) According to the initial estimate of the government, the tax should have yielded €1.6 billion in 2013, that is around 0.2% of total fiscal revenues. One year later, based on the first result for 2012, the estimate was adjusted downwards by fifty percent. In fact, the total revenue for 2012 (August-December) was equal to €0.2 billion: 99.5% from acquisitions of equity securities and 0.5% from transactions on naked sovereign CDS. The tax on high-frequency trading generated no revenue (Finance committee of the French parliament's lower house, Information report n°1328 of 25 July 2013), as will be discussed later.
Hence, the main component of the taxing scheme is the tax on acquisitions of equity securities and similar instruments, defined as shares and other securities that provide or could provide access to capital or voting rights (hereafter, the STT). The tax does not apply to units in collective investment schemes and financial contracts (including options, futures and warrants). Exemptions also include: i) issuance of equity securities on the primary market, ii)
transactions by a clearing house or a central depository, iii) activities related to market making (either for providing liquidity on a regular and continuous basis, or in response to orders initiated by clients, or by hedging positions arising from the fulfilment of the previous tasks), iv) acquisitions in the context of liquidity agreements, v) intra-group and restructuring transactions, vi) temporary transfers of securities, vii) employee saving scheme transactions, viii) exchange or conversion of bonds into shares. To prevent tax avoidance, the tax is due regardless of the place of establishment of the regulated market on which the security is traded, regardless of the place of establishment or residence of the parties to the transaction, and regardless of the place where the contract was entered into.
Importantly for our identification strategy, the STT must be paid on the acquisition of stocks issued by companies whose headquarters are located in France and with market values of more than 1 billion Euros on January 1 st of the year of taxation. we have the opening and closing (adjusted) prices, the volume, the number of shares, the bidask spread quoted at the close of the market, the highest and the lowest prices achieved on the day.
We exclude from the initial sample six companies that have experienced a takeover bid in 2012, plus a company for which information on trading volume is missing. This leaves 61,722
observations, i.e. 97% of the initial sample. Firms subject to the French STT represent about one third of the sample. Further, for robustness checks, we exclude companies for which stock price was lower than €2 at least one day over the period or the total volume over the period below k€60,000. This robustness sample contains 82% of the initial one -see Table B in appendix.
A difference-in-difference approach
To identify the impact of the STT, we rely on the generalized version of the difference-indifference (DiD) methodology, and, hence we estimate the following econometric model:
where is a measure of market liquidity or volatility for the firm i at time t, is a firm dummy variable, is a time dummy variable, is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for large French firms (market values of more than €1 billion) after the introduction of the STT on 1 August 2012 and is an error term. Our coefficient of interest is . We estimate the equation allowing firm-level clustering of the errors that is allowing for correlation of the error term over time within firms (Bertrand et al., 2004) . variables capture differences between firms that are constant over time. In this way, the DiD methodology allows for differences in market behavior between large and small firms before the introduction of the STT, but its underlying assumption is that these differences would remain constant if the STT had not been introduced (the "parallel trends" assumption).
We estimate equation (1) The main advantage of our study is that stocks included both in the treatment and the control groups are traded on the same stock exchange and, hence, with the same organizational, regulatory and competitive environment, and hence are usually subject to the same shocks.
Nevertheless, both control groups used in this study (the foreign firms and the small midcaps)
have their advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of the smaller French stocks is that they allow a better control for country-specific shocks, because they belong to the same country as treatment group. The advantage of foreign firms traded on Euronext is that their size is more comparable with the treatment group. One can question, however, whether this control group allows isolating the effect of the STT from other shocks that could have affected France during the same time period.
One may argue that the STT might have a global impact on all Euronext stocks due to comovement in liquidity. Cespa and Foucault (2011) have shown that liquidity spillover can be positive or negative depending on the cost of price information. In either case, our estimate of the impact could be biased if we consider securities from Euronext as a control group.
Therefore, we use also a control group consisting of German stocks traded on Deutsche Boerse (Xetra) and included in the DAX 30 or the MDAX 50 indexes. This sample is less likely to be impacted by potential co-movement in liquidity.
The choice of the control groups is intended to be theoretically grounded. To confirm their relevance, we report in Table 2 the correlation of daily portfolio returns between treatment and control groups and compare it with previous studies that relied on control groups (Umlauf, 1993; Pomeranets & Weaver, 2012 ). Because we do not have access to data samples of earlier papers, we consider, as a proxy, the main stock indexes in Sweden, the US and the UK. To insure comparability, we first do the same for French, Belgium, Dutch and German stocks. Then we measure the correlation for our exact samples.
Looking at our sample, we find that the correlation of returns between the French, the Our correlation results compare well to earlier studies. Umlauf (1993) analyzed the impact of the STT on the Swedish market, relying on the US and UK markets as control groups. The correlations of 9-19% are very low due to the large distance (geographical, economical, institutional…) of Sweden to the UK or the US in the 1980s, therefore making these stock markets not very suitable as control groups. Pomeranets & Weaver (2012) consider the impact of a STT on the NYSE by relying on Nasdaq as a control group. Although stocks listed on the NYSE and the Nasdaq are very different, the correlation of returns (85%) seems sufficiently large to allow confidence in such control group. 
Measuring market liquidity and volatility
Unlike previous studies (summarized in Table 1 ) that relied on only few measures of liquidity or volatility, we compute a wide range of measures to account for different dimensions of market quality. This section describes variable construction and Table 3 reports descriptive statistics.
Market liquidity. The concept of liquidity is clearly multi-dimensional. 20 As stated, among others, by Sarr and Lybek (2002) , "number of measures must be considered because there is no single theoretically correct and universally accepted measure to determine a market's degree of liquidity". While there is a very broad consensus on that statement, previous papers on the impact of financial transaction tax usually consider only a few indicators.
Usual measures of liquidity in the academic literature can be classified -from the less to the most sophisticated -in three main categories: volume-based measures, transaction cost measures (bid-ask spread), and price-impact measures (liquidity ratio). Accordingly, in this study, we use the following variables:
• Volume, V i,t = Number of shares traded for the stock i on day t *P i,t where P i,t is the closing price for the stock i on the day t; number of shares is expressed in thousands.
• Bid-ask spread, S i,t = 2*100*(
where PA i,t and PB i,t are the asking price and the bid price offered for the stock i at close of market on day t, respectively; bid-ask spread is expressed in percentage.
• Liquidity Ratio, LR i,t = V i,t / | R i,t | where R i,t is the continuously compounded returns, log(P i,t / P i,t-1 ), for the stock i on the day t, respectively; liquidity ratio is expressed in thousands euros of trade for a price change of one percent.
These measures gauge different aspects of market liquidity and can be considered as complements and not substitutes. Measuring liquidity by trading volume is the most intuitive way because it captures markets' breadth and depth. However, this measure suffers from some drawbacks (Vayanos and Wang, 2012) . First, trading activity does not provide a direct estimate of the costs of trading. Second, trading activity can be influenced by other variables than market imperfections, such as the supply of an asset, the number of investors holding it and the size of their trading needs. Another widely used measure of liquidity is bid-ask spread and it is used to assess tightness. Note that this measure provides no information on the prices at which larger transactions take place. By the same token, it provides no information on how the market might respond to a long sequence of transactions in the same direction. Market's response to large buying or selling pressure is an important aspect of illiquidity.
Liquidity denotes the ability to trade large quantities quickly, at low cost, and without moving the price. Several indicators of market resiliency address this definition and we choose to use the liquidity ratio, which assesses how much traded volume is necessary to induce a price change of one percent 21 : higher ratio is associated with higher liquidity.
For the sake of robustness, we also consider the turnover and price reversal:
• Turnover, T i,t = 100*Number of shares traded for the stock i on day t / total number of shares for the stock i on day t available to ordinary investors; turnover is expressed in percentage.
• Market volatility. Similarly, there are several alternative measures to assess market volatility.
According to Engle and Gallo (2006) , for instance, "the concept of volatility itself is somewhat elusive, as many ways exist to measure it and hence to model it". In this paper, we consider three different metrics:
• Conditional variance, CV i,t is proxied by a GARCH(1,1) model -the model for the conditional mean is an AR(1) with a constant.
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• High-low range, HLR i,t = (log PH i,t -log PL i,t )² / 4 log(2) where PH i,t and PL i,t are the highest price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively.
Squared close-to-close return is a common estimator of the daily variance. 24 Volatility clustering has been extensively documented, so we estimate daily conditional variance, proxied by a conventional GARCH(1,1) model over a period of 12 months (February 2012 -January 2013 . 25 Finally, we use a measure of price range, defined as the scaled difference between the highest and the lowest prices achieved on a day. The range provides volatility information from the entire intraday price path, without the need of high frequency data. 22 The idea dates back to Niederhoffer and Osborne (1966) , but was popularized by Roll (1984) who uses the autocovariance of daily stock returns to proxy price reversal. Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) show that the autocovariance of returns correlates negatively with trading volume and, then, suggest to use a conditional estimator. Since then, several specifications have been proposed; amongst them, the measure of Pastor Stambaugh (2003) , which our indicator is inspired by, is one of the most used. 23 We have considered alternative GARCH models, but it does not change the results. 24 Jones and Seguin (1997) and Pomeranets and Weaver (2012) consider an unbiased estimator of the standard deviation computed as √(π/2)| R i,t |. Because the first term is a constant, it does not influence the econometric results later on.
Parkinson (1980) shows that the daily high-low range is an unbiased estimator of daily volatility more efficient than the squared daily return. More recently, Brandt and Diebold (2006) find that its efficiency is comparable with that of the realized variance computed as the sum of squared 3-hour returns 26 , while it is more robust against the effects of market microstructure noise, particularly bid-ask bounce.
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Additionally, for robustness purpose we use also the following measures:
• Daily Price Amplitude, DPA i,t = 2*100*(
where PH i,t and PL i,t
are the highest price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively; price amplitude is expressed in percentage.
Absolute return is very similar to squared return, but the mean is less impacted by extreme variations. We use also a different measure of condition variance by using a different specification for the conditional mean. Daily price amplitude is similar to High-low range, but its computation is somewhat more intuitive. Table C 
Empirical results

Graphical representation of the parallel trends assumption
Difference-in-difference results
We estimate the impact of the introduction of the STT on market quality and present results of difference-in-difference estimation in Tables 4-5. Estimation is done for three different subsamples that differ with respect to treatment and control group. In column 1, we present results for stocks included in the Euronext 100 index, whereas in columns 2-3 -for stocks in Next 150 index. The control group consists of foreign stocks in columns 1 and 3 and of French stocks that are not subject to the STT in column 2 (see section 3.2 for more details about subsamples). Table 4 presents results for liquidity measured by volume, turnover, bid-ask spread, liquidity ratio and price reversal (see section 3.3 for definitions). The results show that the introduction of the STT has reduced market volume and turnover of stocks subject to the STT relatively to control groups. The coefficients are not only statistically significant in all three subsamples but also economically meaningful. According to coefficients in columns 1-3, volumes have declined by 19%, 23% and 29% (corresponding to the coefficients of -0.2159, -0.2671 and -
0.3395).
28 There is also evidence that transaction costs have gone up as the bid-ask spread has Our finding that the introduction of the transaction tax results in the increase of transaction costs and a decline of trading activity is not surprising. The crucial question is whether the tax discouraged "rational" or "noise" traders and, thus, its impact on market resiliency. As discussed in Section 3.3, measures of traded volumes are imperfect measures of liquidity.
When considering theoretically based measures, such as liquidity ratio and price reversal, there is no robust evidence that the STT has had a statistically significant impact. We can conclude that the introduction of the STT has not affected market liquidity, insofar as the market ability to trade large quantities without moving the price has not changed.
Next, we look at the effect of the STT on market volatility (Table 5 ). Volatility is measured by squared returns, absolute returns, conditional variance, high-low range and price amplitude (see section 3.3 for variable definition). Notwithstanding the measure of volatility, we find no robust evidence that the introduction of the STT has affected volatility. Hence, our results reject the hypothesis that the introduction of the STT increases market volatility because of decreased traded volumes. At the same time, the alternative hypothesis that the STT drives away mainly "noise traders" and decreases volatility is neither supported by our data. Most likely, both effects are at work and the introduction of the STT has driven away both "rational" and "noise" traders, both effects canceling each other out. At the end, our results 
are very much in line with Bloomfield, O'Hara and Saar (2009) who conclude that "[STT] reduces activity by noise and informed traders roughly equally (...), and perhaps as a result it does not alter bid-ask spreads or other price impact measures of liquidity, and has only a weak effect (if at all) on the informational efficiency of prices".
Robustness checks
Robustness sample
First, for robustness checks, we applied more stringent filters in order to preclude any outliers that might bias the results. Precisely, we exclude companies for which stock price was lower than €2 at least one day over the period or the total volume over the period below k€60,000.
This robustness sample contains 82% of the initial one. Results are reported in Tables D-E of the appendix and they are very similar with Tables 4-5.
Impact over time
To analyze the impact of the STT, we have chosen a window of 12 month around the tax introduction, mainly due to the recent nature of the tax that was introduced in August 2012.
To test, whether our results are sensitive to the choice of window length and whether we need to consider a longer period after the introduction of the tax, we estimate the effect of the tax separately for every month after the tax introduction. The results, presented in Tables F, indicate that our earlier findings that the STT has a negative effect on market volume and turnover, but positive effect on bid-ask spread are manifested from the first month, are not driven by one month and are rather stable over time. Interestingly, we find that in two subsamples there are strong negative effects on liquidity ratio but they disappear after four months. As before, we find no effect on volatility: almost all coefficients are not statistically significant and when some isolated coefficients appear significant they have conflicting signs.
DAX and MDAX as control groups
One may argue that the STT might have a global impact on all Euronext stocks due to comovement in liquidity that result, inter alia, from the fact that modern investors often buy all stocks in the same index. Cespa and Foucault (2011) have shown that liquidity spillover can be positive or negative depending on the cost of price information. In either case, our estimate of the impact could be biased if we consider other securities from Euronext as a control group.
Therefore, we test robustness of our results by relying on a control group consisting of German stocks traded on Deutsche Boerse (Xetra) and included in the DAX 30 and the MDAX 50 indexes. This sample is less likely to be impacted by potential co-movement in liquidity, but at the same time it is tightly correlated with Euronext stocks to justify its use as a control group (see Table 2 ).
Results of difference-in-difference estimation are presented in Tables G-H. In column 1, the sample consists of largest French stocks in Euronext 100 (treated group) and largest German stocks in DAX (control group). In column 2, the sample covers mid-cap French stocks in Next 150 (treated group) and mid-cap German stocks in MDAX (control group). Both samples confirm our earlier findings. The introduction of the STT always has a negative effect on market volume and there is also evidence that it might increase the bid-ask spread. At the same time, the effect on liquidity ratio is insignificant, meaning that markets are sufficiently liquid to be able to absorb large market transactions without any price effects. Finally, there is no effect on volatility.
Propensity score matching
To further improve the quality of the control group, we rely on propensity score matching.
This will allow us to compare stocks that were subjected to a STT with comparable (foreign and French) stocks listed on Euronext that were not subjected to a tax. In order to determine "comparable" stocks we compute average market capitalization and turnover of stocks included in Euronex 100 and Next 150 before the introduction of the STT and then run a logistic regression, where a probability of a stock being subjected to a tax is a function of these observable characteristics (market capitalization, turnover and volatility). The choice of the first two variables follows Foucault et al. (2011) and we augment the model with an additional volatility measure (squared returns, conditional variance, high-low range). We assure that all variables in the model are statistically significant, because we rely on model coefficients to assign to each stock a probability of being taxed and then match stocks subjected to the STT with stocks that were the "closest" in terms of the propensity score. We test robustness of our results with "the nearest neighbor" and "Kernel" matching. In the second step, we compare the performance of the taxed stocks with the matched stocks that
were not subjected to STT by estimating the following econometric model:
Estimation results, presented in Tables 6-7 , confirm our earlier findings that the introduction of the STT always has a negative effect on market volume, but no effect on market liquidity or volatility. Similar to our earlier findings, a negative effect on market turnover and a positive effect on bid-ask spread is not always robust. This table presents difference-in-difference econometric tests, where we rely on propensity score matching to match firms that were subject to the tax with firms in the control group that had the closest propensity to be subjected to the tax. Matching is performed on market capitalization and turnover. Models are estimated on 6 months before (Feb. 2012-July 2012, 127 days) and 6 months after (Aug. 2012-Jan. 2013, 127 days) the introduction of the STT. STT is a dummy variable = 1 after August 1, 2012 if the firm is subject to the STT; 0 otherwise. ln(Volume i,t ) = ln(Number of shares traded for the stock i on day t * P i,t ) where P i,t is the closing price for the stock i on the day t; number of shares is expressed in thousands. Turnover i,t = 100*Nb. of shares traded for the stock i on day t divided by total number of shares for the stock i on day t available to ordinary investors. Bid-ask spread i,t = 2*100*(PA i,t -PB i,t )/(PA i,t +PB i,t ) where PA i,t and PB i,t are the asking price and the bid price offered for the stock i at close of market on day t, respectively. Liquidity Ratio i,t = V i,t / | R i,t | with R i,t = 100*log(P i,t / P i,t-1 ), for the stock i on the day t, respectively; liquidity ratio is expressed in thousands euros of trades for a price change of 1%. Time and firms dummies are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are presented in parentheses. This table presents difference-in-difference econometric tests, where we rely on propensity score matching to match firms that were subject to the tax with firms in the control group that had the closest propensity to be subjected to the tax. Matching is performed on market capitalization and turnover. Models are estimated on 6 months before (Feb. 2012-July 2012, 127 days) and 6 months after (Aug. 2012-Jan. 2013, 127 days) the introduction of the STT. STT is a dummy variable = 1 after August 1, 2012 if the firm is subject to the STT; 0 otherwise. Squared Return i,t , SR i,t = (R i,t )² with R i,t = 100*log(P i,t / P i,t-1 ). Absolute Return i,t = |R i,t | √π/2. Conditional variance i,t is estimated with a GARCH (1,1) . High-low range, HLR i,t = (log PH i,t -log PL i,t )² / 4 log(2) where PH i,t and PL i,t are the highest price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively. Price amplitude i,t = 2*100*(PH i,t -PL i,t )/(PH i,t +PL i,t ) where PH i,t and PL i,t are the highest price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively. Firm dummies are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are presented in parentheses. 
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Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of financial transaction taxes on market volatility. This question is at the heart of economic policy debate about the use of financial transaction taxes to curb speculative activity and render financial markets more stable. In contrast, the opponents argue that taxation of financial transactions will hurt market liquidity, thus, making markets even more volatile.
Since theoretical predictions on this subject are ambiguous, there is a need for an econometric analysis. Although a number of papers empirically examine the impact of STT, there is no paper that can make a strong case for a causal relationship between STT and volatility. Most of these studies do not address endogeneity problems inasmuch as they cannot isolate the impact of the STT from other economic developments during the same time period.
In this paper, we study the impact of the STT introduction in France in 2012 on market liquidity and volatility. Unlike previous studies, we are able to isolate the effect of the tax due to the unique design of the French STT. As the tax is levied only on large French firms traded on Euronext, this provides us with two control groups (smaller French firms and foreign firms) and allows us to use difference-in-difference methodology. Our results show that the introduction of the STT has reduced volume and turnover of stocks and increased bid-ask spreads. At the same time, we find no effect on theoretically based measures of liquidity, such as price impact. As to volatility measures, the results are mostly insignificant. Our results are robust to a number of robustness tests that include different control groups, dynamic effects and propensity score matching.
To sum up, our investigation shows that STT is neither a panacea nor a "madness" for financial markets. Our results do not confirm expectations that STT decreases market volatility by curbing speculative activity, but at the same time, there is no significant effect on market volatility and even liquidity. c) CFAO, which experienced a takeover bid in 2012, is removed in the final sample. d) Degven, Dockwise, Mediq, and LBI International which experienced a takeover bid in 2012, is removed in the final sample. Espirito Santo Finl.GP. is also removed in the final sample due to infrequent trading.
Table B. Number of observations
This table provides the number of observations (nb firms × nb days) for each sample and the percentage of the initial sample. The sample period extends over 12 months: 6 months before (Feb. 2012 -July. 2012 and 6 months after (Aug. 2012 -Jan. 2013 , 127 days) the introduction of the STT. The initial sample includes all stocks included in the Euronext 100 and Next 150 indexes. The final sample excludes all companies that experienced a takeover bid over the period (#6) or securities infrequently traded (#1). The robustness sample excludes companies for which we lack observations at the beginning of the period (#2) and all observations that meet the following criteria: stock price below €2 at least one day over the period or total volume over the period below k€60,000.
Table C. Correlation Matrix
This table provides pairwise correlation coefficients for the liquidity measures and the volatility measures. The sample period extends over 12 months: 6 months before (Feb. 2012 -July. 2012 and 6 months after (Aug. 2012 -Jan. 2013 , 127 days) the introduction of the STT. ln(Volume i,t ) = ln(Number of shares traded for the stock i on day t * P i,t ) where P i,t is the closing price for the stock i on the day t. Turnover i,t = Nb. of shares traded for the stock i on day t divided by total number of shares for the stock i on day t available to ordinary investors. Bid-ask spread i,t = 2*(PA i,t -PB i,t )/(PA i,t +PB i,t ) where PA i,t and PB i,t are the asking price and the bid price offered for the stock i at close of market on day t, respectively. Liquidity Ratio i,t = V i,t / | R i,t | with R i,t = log(P i,t / P i,t-1 ). Squared Return i,t , SR i,t = (R i,t )² with R i,t = 100*log(P i,t / P i,t-1 ). Absolute Return i,t = |R i,t | √π/2. Conditional variance i,t is estimated with a GARCH (1,1) . High-low range, HLR i,t = (log PH i,t -log PL i,t )² / 4 log(2) where PH i,t and PL i,t are the highest price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively. Price amplitude i,t = 2*100*(PH i,t -PL i,t )/(PH i,t +PL i,t ) where PH i,t and PL i,t are the highest price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively.
Liquidity measures
ln (Volume i,t We exclude companies for which we lack observations at the beginning of the period (#2) and all observations that meet the following criteria: stock price below €2 at least one day over the period or total volume over the period below k€60,000. PL i,t are the highest price and the lowest price achieved for the stock i on the day t, respectively. Time and firms dummies are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are presented in parentheses. We exclude companies for which we lack observations at the beginning of the period (#2) and all observations that meet the following criteria: stock price below €2 at least one day over the period or total volume over the period below k€60,000. This table presents Probit models that allow us to compute propensity scores to match firms that were subject to the tax with firms in the control group that had the closest propensity to be subjected to the tax. Models are estimated on the data averaged for 6 months before the introduction of the tax (Feb. 2012 -July 2012 . Market capitalization = Total number of shares for the stock i on day t * P i,t where P i,t is the closing price for the stock i on the day t. Turnover i,t = 100*Nb. of shares traded for the stock i on day t divided by total number of shares for the stock i on day t available to ordinary investors. 1 000 000 1 500 000 2 000 000 2 500 000
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